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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 2019, the United States and the Mexican governments 
attempted to capture Ovidio Guzman Lopez, son of the infamous drug 
lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, for extradition to the United States for 
multiple drug related charges.1 Government officials believed that Lopez
was the newest kingpin of the Sinaloa drug cartel and, therefore, was integral 
to the cartel’s operation.2 Although soldiers were prepared, the mission to 
capture Lopez flooded the city with terror and chaos.3 Mexican officials
were initially able to detain Lopez, but police were soon outnumbered and 
out-gunned when the cartel’s reinforcements arrived.4 Some residents fled 
 1. Natalie Gallón, Son of ‘El Chapo’ Was Caught During a Massive Shootout. 
Mexican Officials Say they Released him to Save Lives, CNN (Oct. 18, 2019, 5:04 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/18/americas/el-chapo-son-custody-shootout-intl-hnk/index. 
html [http://perma.cc/D9LU-DRUS].
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the area while others were helplessly pinned in their homes as federal 
troops fought cartel members who were armed with heavy artillery and 
armored vehicles.5 The mission failed as Lopez was ultimately released 
by officials in order to stop the violence.6 
This battle is not an isolated incident. Drug cartels have turned parts of 
Mexico into warzones. In November 2019, a Mexican drug cartel ambushed 
a vehicle carrying nine U.S. citizens, six of whom were children.7 Nine 
bodies were found burned in a vehicle peppered with bullet holes.8 One 
child’s body was found “[f]acedown, crunched up in fetal position” out of 
fear.9 
Since 2006, when Mexico began its anti-drug campaigns, assisted heavily 
by the United States, there have been over 300,000 drug-related homicides 
in Mexico.10 In 2018, a record high of nearly 36,000 homicides in Mexico
were tied to drug cartels.11 This trend continued in 2019 with approximately
ninety murders a day related to Mexico’s war on cartels.12 
The global “War on Drugs” has been highly criticized, especially in 
recent years.13 With the flaws discussed below, former President Trump 
5. Id.
 6. Id.
 7. Suzanne Gamboa, The U.S. and Mexico have Waged War on Drug Cartels for 
Decades. They’ve Fallen Short, NBCNEWS (Nov. 5, 2019, 2:38 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
news/latino/u-s-mexico-have-waged-war-drug-cartels-decades-they-n1076781 [http://perma.
cc/B9RF-2Q84]; Lizbeth Diaz, Killed American Family May Have Been ‘Bait’ in Mexican 
Cartel Fight: Relatives, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2019, 10:24 AM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-mexico-violence/killed-american-family-may-have-been-bait-in-mexican-cartel-
fight-relatives-idUSKBN1XG2MZ [https://perma.cc/89B4-C2C7] (“The nine American 
women and children killed in northern Mexico were victims of a territorial dispute between 
an arm of the Sinaloa Cartel and a rival gang . . . .”).
8. Diaz, supra note 7. 
 9. Joel Rose, This Grieving Family Wants the U.S. to Designate Mexican Cartels as 




 11. Brianna Lee, Mexico’s War on Drugs, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 22,
2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-drug-war [http://perma.cc/VLX7-LQ72]. 
12. Id.
13. George P. Shultz & Pedro Aspe, The Failed War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/31/opinion/failed-war-on-drugs.html [http://
perma.cc/3ZWW-98VR]; Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and 










   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
   
 
and Congress proposed adapting the War on Drugs to become more like 
the “War on Terror” by recategorizing drug cartels as foreign terrorist 
organizations (FTOs).14 Although recategorization could be applied to
drug cartels throughout the world, this Comment will only discuss implications 
towards Latin American drug cartels (LADCs). 
Since policies and laws from the War on Terror would be applied to
LADCs under this recategorization to FTOs, it is important to have a basic 
working knowledge about the War on Terror. The War on Drugs and the 
War on Terror are based on different societal emotions and histories, so fleshing 
out the similarities and differences will allow for a fuller comparison. 
First, this Comment will provide a brief history about the War on Drugs,
the ineffectiveness of the policies implemented to combat the War on
Drugs, and a brief history about the War on Terror. Then, this Comment
will discuss applicable international and domestic laws, including the
Geneva Conventions, international human rights law, U.S. terrorism laws, 
U.S. drug laws, and U.S. case law. Additionally, this Comment will consider 
whether LADCs can be recategorized as FTOs under current U.S. law, analyze 
how international laws would interact with the recategorized LADCs, and 
outline both the benefits and consequences with recategorizing LADCs as 
FTOs. Finally, this Comment will advocate against the recategorization of 
LADCs as FTOs. Rather, this Comment will advocate for change in U.S. 
domestic drug laws, which would have an international impact and 
fundamentally alter the war on drugs. 
A. A Brief History About the War on Drugs 
Until the twentieth century, most federally illicit drugs were legal, including 
cocaine, marijuana, and heroin.15 However, around the turn of the twentieth 
century, Congress passed various laws that taxed or restricted the right to 
import, possess, and use various drugs.16 For example, the Harrison Act in 
1914 regulated and taxed opiates and cocaine, the Smoking Opium Exclusion 
Act in 1909 banned the non-medicinal use of opium, and the Marihuana 
14. Drug Cartel Terrorist Designation Act, H.R. 1700, 116th Cong. (2019); John
Wagner, Trump: ‘Very Seriously’ Considering Designating Mexican Drug Cartels as Terrorists, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2019, 7:05 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-
very-seriously-considering-designating-mexican-drug-cartels-as-terrorists/2019/03/12/9b 
fc30f0-44cb-11e9-8aab-95b8d80a1e4f_story.html [http://perma.cc/Z5S7-EZBV]. 
15.  Coyne & Hall, supra note 13.
 16. War on Drugs – Timeline in America, Definition & Facts, HISTORY (Dec. 7, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/topics/crime/the-war-on-drugs [http://perma.cc/WG2Q-ZGLC]
[hereinafter War on Drugs]. 
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Tax Act in 1937 placed a federal tax on the sale of cannabis and hemp
products.17 
In 1971, President Nixon began the “War on Drugs” due to a perceived
increase of recreational drug use during the 1960s.18 Drugs were declared 
“public enemy number one” and the Controlled Substances Act was signed 
into law.19 The Act lays schedules of drug classifications—that are later 
discussed in this Comment—and became the foundation of the modern 
War on Drugs.20 
The War on Drugs continued in the Regan administration and expanded
with force. First Lady Nancy Reagan began the “Just Say No” campaign in 
an effort to educate young children on the dangers of drug usage.21 Congress
also passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1986, which implemented mandatory 
minimum sentences for certain federal drug offenses.22 
While the Controlled Substances Act is still in effect today and the 
Trump administration continued to focus on combatting drug use,23 many
states have begun to push back against the Act’s framework. As of 2019, 
more than thirty states legalized marijuana, a schedule one drug under the 
Controlled Substances Act, for either recreational or medical use.24 Moreover, 
resistance to the War on Drugs is not unique to the United States. Portugal 
decriminalized all drugs in 2001 and Oregon decriminalized the possession 
of small amounts of various schedule drugs.25 Despite the ongoing global 
17. Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, H.R. 6252, 63rd Cong. (1914); Marihuana Tax Act,
Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551, 551–56 (1937) (enacted); War on Drugs, supra note 16. 




 22. Id. 
23. See Ending America’s Opioid Crisis, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
opioids/ [http://perma.cc/MG9D-CPLN].
24. See Skye Gould & Jeremy Berke, Legal Marijuana Just Went on Sale in Illinois. 
Here Are All the States Where Cannabis is Legal, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www. 
businessinsider.nl/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1?international=true&r=US [https://perma.cc/
YUN7-DX4X].
 25. Chris Ingraham, Portugal Decriminalised Drugs 14 Years Ago – and Now Hardly 
Anyone Dies From Overdosing, INDEPENDENT (June 7, 2015, 6:59 AM), https://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/europe/portugal-decriminalised-drugs-14-years-ago-and-now-hardly-
anyone-dies-from-overdosing-10301780.html [http://perma.cc/GR9Z-NLSZ]; Cleve R.
Wootson Jr. & Jaclyn Peiser, Oregon Decriminalizes Possession of Hard Drugs, as Four 































War on Drugs, many have questioned the effectiveness of current policies 
and call for its end. 
B. The Current International War on Drugs is Ineffective
The War on Drugs has profoundly affected the United States and the world, 
but these effects were not likely intended. To fight the War on Drugs, 
taxpayers have paid over $1 trillion since 1970 and continue to pay over 
$51 billion every year.26 
Proponents claim that this spending results in benefits to society, such as
the reduction of drug-related crimes, diseases, overdoses, and the establishment
of effective means for dismantling organized criminal enterprises.27 
These proclaimed benefits, however, do not reflect the experiences of 
U.S. society. For example, incarceration rates for minor drug offenses have 
increased while disproportionally affecting ethnic minorities and poor 
communities.28 Also, once an individual is convicted of a drug-related
crime, they are punished even after they serve their sentence.29 The American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has referred to the current drug laws as the 
“new Jim Crow.”30 Finally, the House of Representatives created a simple
resolution “[t]o acknowledge that the War on Drugs has been a failed policy 
in achieving the goal of reducing drug use, and . . . to apologize to the 
individuals and communities that were victimized by this policy.”31 
Although the United States has led the War on Drugs, its effects have 
negatively impacted other countries. For example, since the United States 
began assisting former Mexican President Calderón in anti-drug operations, 
there has been over 85,000 drug-related deaths.32 Additionally, the United 
States’ eradication of opium cultivation in Afghanistan “not only failed to 
reduce global supply but [has] also empowered and funded the Taliban.”33 
Likewise, some negative effects have been felt both internationally and 
domestically. Cartels and dealers have started to sell more pure and potent 
drugs.34 Currently, there is no agency ensuring potency or regulating
26.  Coyne & Hall, supra note 13. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29.  Tens of thousands of students are denied financial aid for higher education and 
job opportunities; promotions are also often limited once a person is convicted of a drug-
related offense. Id. 
 30. Graham Boyd, The Drug War Is the New Jim Crow, NACLA REPORT ON THE 
AMERICAS (Aug. 2001), https://www.aclu.org/drug-war-new-jim-crow [http://perma.cc/ 
6ZYC-8YBB].
31.  H.R. 933, 115th Cong. (2018). 
32.  Coyne & Hall, supra note 13.
 33. Id. 
34. Id. 
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impurities in substances because the drugs are illegal.35 As a consequence,
it is suspected that the use of these more pure and potent substances has 
caused an increase in overdose deaths.36 In 2014, there were almost fifteen 
deaths for every 100,000 people in the United States, compared to the 
approximately one death for every 100,000 people in 1971.37 Moreover, 
due to various state and federal laws that prohibit buying needles without 
a prescription, drug users often reuse dirty needles, which increases the 
risk of transmitting illnesses like Hepatitis C, Hepatitis B, and HIV/AIDS.38 
In 2012, an estimated 91,000 Americans were living with HIV/AIDS 
acquired by drug use.39 
The War on Drugs has increased drug-related violence because people 
have no legal means to resolve disputes or protect their businesses interests.40 
Sellers and buyers cannot turn to police or other legal “dispute-resolution
mechanisms” because their participation in the drug trade would result in 
incarceration.41 Since legal means of solving disputes are not possible,
“individuals must solve their own problems, which often means they use 
violence.”42 
Finally, the War on Drugs directly led to the “cartelization” of the drug 
trade for two main reasons.43 First, drug prohibition keeps only some 
manufacturers out of the industry, but those remaining are “more comfortable 
with using violence and engaging in illicit activity.”44 Secondly, government 
prohibitions “effectively drive out would-be competitors, making it easier 
for cartels to form and maintain their dominant market position.”45 This is 
because the operations of incarcerated small independent manufacturers, 
distributers, and dealers is unlikely to survive because users can find a new 
source for their drugs.46 Large cartels, on the other hand, continue their 









































   
to fill the void.47 This phenomena creates cartel monopolies because only 
cartels are left to compete with one another when smaller manufacturers 
are incarcerated, which leads to higher prices, increased violence, and 
corruption.48 
Although arguments in favor of the drug prohibition have existed since 
the inception of the War on Drugs, history and statistics prove its 
ineffectiveness. This means that the United States needs to determine a new
approach to the drug epidemic. This Comment considers two solutions:
(1) the recategorization of LADCs to FTOs and (2) the legalization of 
recreational drugs in the United States. 
C. A Brief History About the War on Terror 
On September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists hijacked four East Coast 
flights.49 Three of these flights crashed into heavily populated and iconic
landmarks, including the New York City Twin Towers and the Pentagon 
in Washington D.C.50 Almost 3,000 people died.51 The infamous terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 shook the world and began the United 
States-led global War on Terror.52 After discovering that al-Qaeda and its 
leader, Osama bin Laden, were behind the terrorist attack,53 the United States
launched “Operation Enduring Freedom,” which aimed at removing the 
Taliban from power in Afghanistan and crippling al-Qaeda.54 Afghanistan’s
Taliban regime protected al-Qaeda after the September 2001 terrorist 
attacks at the cost of people struggling to survive in Afghanistan, so 
the United States and its allies joined in air strikes and ground war.55 
Operation Enduring Freedom was never meant to be a short war, but rather 
it was purposely going to take years to fight.56 
47. Id.
 48. Id.
 49. A Timeline of the U.S.-Led War on Terror, HISTORY (May 5, 2020), https:// 
www.history.com/topics/21st-century/war-on-terror-timeline [http://perma.cc/5LX4-MFTZ]




 53. Id. 
54. Operation Enduring Freedom, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND (Aug. 7,
2020, 1:27 PM), https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/ 
middle-east/operation-enduring-freedom.html [perma.cc/U8EQ-L633]. 
55. The Global War on Terror: The First 100 Days, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 20, 
2009), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm [https://perma.cc/5ZED-MCTG]; 
U.S.-led War on Terror, supra note 49. 
56. See id. It is not clear that the public was aware of the U.S. government’s intent
for Operation Enduring Freedom to last an extended period of time. 
372
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The War on Terror spread to Iraq in early 2003 when the United States
attempted to stop Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, from using “weapons
of mass destruction.”57 By December 2003, Hussein was captured.58 In 
2006, Hussein was executed for war crimes and crimes against humanity.59 
President Obama ultimately declared an end to military operations in Iraq 
in August 2010.60 
Finally, in May 2011, Osama bin Laden was found in a Pakistan compound 
where he was killed by U.S. Special Forces.61 Although President Obama 
announced a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in June 2011, 
the war in Afghanistan did not officially end until December 2014.62 
Under the Trump administration, the United States and the Taliban 
worked towards an agreement to withdraw the remaining 14,000 U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan.63 Although the United States had been withdrawing
from Afghanistan, the birthplace of the War on Terror, the U.S. military 
continues to fight the War on Terror in 80 countries worldwide, which is 
more than “40% of the world’s nations.”64 
While the United States focused on Hussein and bin Laden, another 
terrorist group gained strength in the Middle East—the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant group (ISIL).65 Once Hussein was killed and his regime
in Iraq collapsed in 2003, ISIL filled the void and fanned the flames of 
civil war.66 ISIL grew because of “deepening furrows between Sunni and 








 64. Stephanie Savell, This Map Shows Where in the World the U.S. Military Is 
Combatting Terrorism, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan.–Feb. 2019), https://www.smithsonian69
mag.com/history/map-sh70ows-places-world-wher71e-us-military-operate72s-180970997/
[http://per73ma.cc/Z35A-A7FP].
65.  ISIL was originally known as the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (“ISIS”). See 
The Rise and Fall of ISIL Explained, AL JAZEERA (June 20, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/ 
features/2017/6/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-isil-explained [https://perma.cc/34Y9-CTSV]
[hereinafter Rise and Fall of ISIL].
66. See Daniel Byman, Worried About an Islamic State Comeback? Here’s Why 
















    
  
 
   
  
   
 
  
   
    
  
networks and sleeper cells.”67 While ISIL was originally part of al-Qaeda, 
it became the notorious terrorist organization known today in 2013 when 
it built its own independent terrorist cell in Syria.68 ISIL became widely 
known for brutal violence and terrorist attacks in Iraq.69 
There have also been numerous international terrorist attacks. In July 
2005, al-Qaeda bombed London, England, injuring over 700 individuals 
and killing 52 people.70 In 2015, ISIL attacked Paris, France, resulting in
130 deaths and nearly 500 injured people.71 
While fighting the War on Terror, the U.S. military has been accused of 
detainee abuse and torture. Between the military base in Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the United States has undoubtedly 
engaged in unthinkable behavior for the sake of fighting terror.72 These
allegations have led to inquiries and lawsuits as discussed in Section II. 
The War on Terror, and how the United States fights it, has grown from 
its inception under former President George W. Bush as international threats
have changed. Under the Obama and Trump administrations, drone strikes 
became the predominant method of fighting the War on Terror because 
such warfare “makes it easier and cheaper to conduct counterterrorism 
operations, thus reducing casualty risk for U.S. and allied troops.”73 During
Obama’s eight years as President, there were 1,878 drone strikes, compared 
to the 2,243 drone strikes under the Trump administration.74 
67. Rise and Fall of ISIL, supra note 65. 
68. Id. See also Martin Smith & Linda Hirsch, Frontline: The Rise of ISIS, PUB. BROAD. 
SERV. (Oct. 18, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/rise-of-isis/transcript/
[http://perma.cc/2QSY-778A] (“ISIS didn’t become the group that it is today until they 
went to Syria. Syria is what made ISIS[,] ISIS.”). 
69. Rise and Fall of ISIL, supra note 65. 
70. U.S.-led War on Terror, supra note 49. 
71. 2015 Paris Terror Attacks Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 19, 2018, 3:38 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/08/europe/2015-paris-terror-attacks-fast-facts/index.html 
[http://perma.cc/D8BC-2ECR].
72. Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 30, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/red-cross-finds-detainee-
abuse-in-guantanamo.html [http://perma.cc/KNG3-5GFL]; Jenifer Fenton, Ex-Guantanamo
Guard Tells of Violence Against Detainees, CNN (Oct. 28, 2011, 11:14 AM), https:// 
www.cnn.com/2011/10/28/world/meast/guantanamo-guard/index.html [http://perma.cc/ 
CWM6-YTDU]; Maha Hilal, Abu Ghraib: The Legacy of Torture in the War on Terror, AL 
JAZEERA (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/abu-ghraib-legacy-
torture-war-terror-170928154012053.html [http://perma.cc/AFK2-BCMB].
73. Marcus Müller, The Fog of Drone War: Lessons from the U.S. and European Armed 
Drone Policy, AM. INST. FOR CONTEMP. GER. STUD. (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.aicgs.org/ 
2019/04/the-fog-of-drone-war-lessons-from-the-u-s-and-european-armed-drone-policy/ 
[http://perma.cc/B9YJ-P34W].
74. Trump Revokes Obama Rule on Reporting Drone Strike Deaths, BBC (Mar. 7,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47480207 [http://perma.cc/RZ2B-SJBU]. 
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II. APPLICABLE LAW
The applicable law for recategorizing LADCs as FTOs is divided into
two sections: (1) domestic laws and (2) international laws governing the 
United States. The relevant domestic laws include terrorism laws and drug
laws. Pertinent international laws include the Geneva Conventions and
International Humanitarian Law, both of which govern how the United 
States interacts with foreign countries and entities.
A. Domestic Laws 
1. Terrorism Laws 
a. Statutory Law 
The United States established various laws to combat terrorism. Under
8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a)(1)(A-C), the Secretary of State can designate an 
organization as a foreign terrorist organization if: (1) it is a foreign 
organization; (2) the organization engages in terrorist activity, terrorism, 
or retains the ability and intent to do so; and (3) said activity threatens the 
security of United States nationals or United States national security.75 
Terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”76 
Terrorist activity includes: 
(I) The highjacking [sic] or sabotage of any conveyance . . . (II) The seizing or
detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual 
in order to compel a third person . . . (III) A violent attack upon an internationally 
protected person . . . (IV) An assassination. (V) The use of any—(a) biological 
agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or (b) explosive, firearm, or 
other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), 
with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or 
to cause substantial damage to property. (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to 
do any of the foregoing.77 
This law also allows terrorist activity to be prosecuted in the United 
States if (1) the activities were illegal in the place it was committed (i.e. 
outside of U.S. jurisdiction) or (2) if the activity would have been committed 
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (defining terrorist activity); 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) 
(defining terrorist activity); 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–(C). 
76.  22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2). 
77.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)–(VI). 
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in the United States and was illegal in the United States.78 Once deemed 
a terrorist organization, the organization is subject to all U.S. laws in place 
to protect national security.79 An organization can file a petition for revocation
and submit evidence that they are not an FTO, which the Secretary of State 
will review.80 The only other way to change an FTO designation is by an 
act of Congress.81 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(b)(1), it is illegal in the United States to provide
material support to foreign terrorists.82 In this context, material support
includes “property . . . or service, including currency or monetary instruments 
or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice 
or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communications 
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . 
and transportation.”83 
The detention of prisoners designated as terrorists has led to many 
controversies both internationally and domestically. Almost immediately 
after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Congress 
passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) to fight 
international terrorism.84 The AUMF allows the President to “use all necessary 
and appropriate force” against nations or forces that the President determines 
were involved in the September 2001 terrorist attacks.85 Former President 
George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13440, which interpreted the 
Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 to be inapplicable to the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s detention and interrogation of detainees in the War 
on Terror.86 He also decided that captured Taliban and al-Qaeda members
are not protected by prisoner of war status; nonetheless, he claimed they 
would be treated humanely.87 
78.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(B). These laws include but are not limited to the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978), and 
the Military Force Authorization resolution 2001, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
80.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B). 
81.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(5). 
82.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
83.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 
84.  Military Force Authorization Resolution 2001, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001). 
85. Id.
 86. See infra Section II(B)(1); Exec. Order No. 13,440, 3 C.F.R. 13440 (2007). 
 87. George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal
Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891, 892 (2002). But see Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, 
Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063, TIME (June 19, 2005), https://time.com/3624326/inside- 
the-interrogation-of-detainee-063/ [http://perma.cc/9AES-CYM5] (explaining inhumane 
conditions of detainees). 
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Congress also quickly passed the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(PATRIOT) Act to fight domestic terrorism.88 The PATRIOT Act is designed
to arm law enforcement with new tools to detect and prevent terrorism.89 
This Act allows for increased surveillance, delayed informing to suspects 
of warrants used to search private spaces, information sharing across agencies, 
obtaining search warrants in any jurisdiction, increase in penalties for 
convicted terrorists, and many other tools.90 
b. Case Law 
Operating under the AUMF framework, the federal government attempted
to exclude all War on Terror detainee cases from judicial review.91 The
government sought locations to hold detainees labeled as enemy combatants 
where U.S. courts would not have jurisdiction in attempts to avoid courts 
from “imposing the peacetime standards with which they were most 
familiar.”92 The government settled on U.S. Naval base in Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba (GTMO), where individuals suspected of being a terrorist were 
held for extended periods of time without being formally charged with 
crimes and received no right to judicial review.93 
The U.S. Supreme Court finally heard and consolidated two habeas corpus
cases from Guantánamo Bay detainees in June 2004. In the first case, Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, a U.S. citizen named Hamdi was detained while visiting
Afghanistan, labeled an enemy combatant, and held indefinitely by U.S. 
military forces at GTMO.94 Hamdi filed a writ of habeas corpus claiming
he was being denied due process under the Fifth Amendment and sought 
to challenge his status as an “enemy combatant.”95 The government argued
88. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter 
USA PATRIOT Act].
89. Id.; The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm [http://perma.cc/C5NV-ML7V]. 
90. See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 88; The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life
and Liberty, supra note 89. 
91. Jonathan Shaw, The War and the Writ Habeas Corpus and Security in an Age of 
Terrorism, HARV. MAG. (Jan. 2009), https://harvardmagazine.com/2009/01/the-war-the-
writ [http://perma.cc/8ZED-UX9C].
92. Id.
 93. See id.
94.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 511–13 (2004). 
95. Id. at 515. 
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that during a time of war, the Executive could declare detainees who were
suspected of fighting against the United States as “enemy combatants”
and, therefore, restrict their access to the courts.96 The Court held that the 
judiciary did not have to defer to the Executive as to the status of “enemy 
combatants” and, thus, detainees had a right to challenge their status in 
court.97 
In the second case, Rasul v. Bush, non-U.S. citizens were detained by 
U.S. military forces in the Middle East and were held indefinitely at GTMO.98 
The detainee’s families filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus
claiming that the U.S. government could not hold non-citizens indefinitely 
and deny the detainees access to the courts.99 The government argued U.S.
courts lacked jurisdiction over non-citizens and the detainees were being 
held in a country where the United States was not sovereign—Cuba.100 
The Court found that the United States had sufficient control over GTMO 
to ensure habeas corpus rights and, therefore, federal courts had jurisdiction.101 
Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.102 
Hamdan was Osama bin Laden’s former driver and was detained by U.S. 
military forces and held indefinitely at GTMO.103 After Hamdan filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention and enemy 
combatant status, he received a trial before a military tribunal that designated 
him as an enemy combatant.104 The Court held that Congress did not
properly authorize military tribunals to hear detainee cases and, therefore, 
the use of the military tribunals violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
and Geneva Conventions Common Article 3.105 
Congress responded to Hamdan by passing the Military Commission
Act of 2006, which explicitly established new Military Commissions to 
hear GTMO detainee cases.106 Some political scientists, lawyers, and 
humanitarians theorized that Congress and President Bush were trying to 
keep high-profile cases out of civilian federal courts.107 Ultimately, the
Court held that the Military Commission Act of 2006 operated in violation 
of the Geneva Conventions and unconstitutionally suspended detainees’ 
96. Id. at 519. 
97. See id. at 525. 
98.  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004). 
99. Id. at 471–72. 
100. Id. at 475–76. 
101. Id. at 481. 
102.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
103. Id. at 570. 
104.  Id. at 570–71. 
105. Id. at 593–95, 628–32. 
106. HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 687 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2015). 
107. Id.
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writ of habeas corpus and, thus, detainees who were labeled as enemy
combatants could seek writs of habeas corpus.108 
2. Drug Laws
American drug laws are comprehensive and reach outside U.S. jurisdiction
in the guise of national security. Congress passed 21 U.S.C. § 812, which 
categorized drugs into five “schedules” ranging from Schedule I to 
Schedule V.109 Schedule I substances are completely prohibited because
they have a “high potential for abuse,” no accepted medical purpose, and 
“a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision.”110 Schedule
V substances are not prohibited but rather require a prescription from a 
medical professional because these substances have “low potential for 
abuse” and “abuse of the drug . . . may lead to limited physical dependence” 
but has current accepted medical use for treatment.111 Schedule I and
Schedule II are most relevant for this Comment because they are the 
predominant drugs that cartels use in their drug trade.112 
The U.S. government has expanded the reach of the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) with the enactment of several laws. For instance, 21 U.S.C.
§ 959 prohibits the manufacturing or distribution of controlled substances 
in which a person intended, knew, or reasonably should have known that 
the substance would be imported into the United States.113 This act “is
intended to reach acts of manufactur[ing] or distribution committed outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”114 
Additionally, 21 U.S.C. § 960 prohibits unlawful acts, such as “knowingly
or intentionally import[ing] or export[ing] a controlled substance” and
“manufactur[ing] [or] possess[ing] with intent to distribute . . . a controlled 
substance.”115 The law also sets forth the penalties for committing such 
108. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008). 
109.  21 U.S.C. § 812(a)–(b); Understanding the Controlled Substances Act, ADDICTION 
CTR., https://www.addictioncenter.com/addiction/controlled-substances-act-and-scheduling/
[http://perma.cc/83T9-R6H2].
110. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); see also Understanding the Controlled Substances Act,
supra note 109. 
111.  21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2). 
112. Schedule II substances are deemed to have a “high potential for abuse,” current 
accepted medical use, and “abuse of the drug . . . may lead to severe psychological or physical 
dependence.” Id. at § 812(b)(3). 
113.  21 U.S.C. § 959. 
114. Id. at § 959(d). 
115. Id. at § 960(a)(1)–(3). 
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unlawful acts.116 21 U.S.C. § 960a then extends the penalties for unlawful 
acts to foreign terrorist organizations.117 The statute also expands jurisdiction 
beyond U.S. borders if the offense affects foreign commerce.118 Finally, 
if the offense occurs outside of the United States but the “offender is 
brought into or found in the United States,” the United States has jurisdiction 
to prosecute.119 
B. International Laws
1. The Geneva Conventions & Additional Protocols
The four Geneva Conventions and three Additional Protocols are a 
series of international treaties created to establish the Humanitarian Law 
of Armed Conflict.120 These Conventions and the Additional Protocols 
“are at the core of international humanitarian law.”121 Common Article 3 
was considered a breakthrough because it was the first international 
agreement to cover a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC).122 A 
NIAC involves only one sovereign state and includes a variety of conflicts, 
such as “civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spill over into other States 
[and] internal conflicts in which third States . . . intervene alongside the 
government.”123 
The Geneva Conventions apply International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
only to International Armed Conflicts (IACs) or NIACs.124 IACs are subject 
to most of the Geneva Conventions, whereas NIACs are only subject to 
116. Id. at § 960(b). 
117. Id. at § 960a. 
118. Id. at § 960a(b)(2). 
119. Id. at § 960a(b)(5). 
120. The first Geneva Convention “protects wounded and sick soldiers on land 
during war,” the second Geneva Convention “protects wounded, sick and shipwrecked 
military personnel at sea during war,” the third Geneva Convention “applies to prisoners 
of war” and the fourth Geneva Convention “protects civilians.” The Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2014), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols [http:// 
perma.cc/3RBC-JJAW] [hereinafter The Geneva Conventions]; Geneva Conventions, HISTORY
(Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/geneva-convention [http://perma. 
cc/UM8R-BS9W].
121. The Geneva Conventions, supra note 120. 
122. Id.
 123. Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law: What is International 
Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (July 2004), https://www.icrc.org/ 
en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf [http://perma.cc/AQN8-SMJ6] [hereinafter Advisory
Service]; The Geneva Conventions, supra note 120. 
124. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Advisory Service, supra note 123. 
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Geneva Convention Common Article 3 (Common Article 3) and Additional 
Protocol II Article I (Protocol II Article I).125 
Common Article 3 only applies to armed conflicts occurring between 
non-state armed groups.126 Despite Common Article 3’s requirement that
a NIAC occur “in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,” 
this language has lost its importance over time and is often overlooked in 
practice.127 This is because “any armed conflict between governmental
armed forces and armed groups or between such groups cannot but take 
place on the territory of one of the Parties to the Convention.”128 The term 
“High Contracting Parties” in the Geneva Conventions refers to state 
governments that are a party to the Conventions and could cause legal 
problems in armed conflicts.129 
Additionally, Protocol II Article 1 supplements and develops Common 
Article 3 but does not amend it.130 It mandates that NIACs are not internal 
disturbances, such as riots or sporadic acts of violence.131 To determine
whether this minimum level of violence is met, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) suggests two requirements.132 First, there must 
be a minimum level of intensity in the hostilities.133 Second, nongovernmental
entities who are considered “parties to the conflict” must possess organized 
125. See How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian 
Law?, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 1–4 (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/
assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf [http://perma.cc/R76R-K94N] [hereinafter
Armed Conflict Defined]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol II]; The Geneva Conventions, supra note 120. 
126. See Armed Conflict Defined, supra note 125, at 3.
 127. See id.
 128. Id.
 129. See Commentary of 2017 Article 1: Respect for the Convention, INT’L COMM. 
OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=
openDocument&documentId=76AB35F0B510E070C1258115003B9413 [http://perma.cc/
9ZK3-EZP6]; “The ICRC is an independent, neutral organization ensuring humanitarian 
protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence,” 
and was adopted under the original Geneva Conventions of 1864. Mandate and Mission, 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/mandate [http://
perma.cc/ZLH5-ABNV]. 
130. Armed Conflict Defined, supra note 125, at 3. 



























   
 
  
armed forces as to essentially have control of an area.134 Unlike Common 
Article 3, Additional Protocol II applies to state armed forces as well as 
non-state armed groups.135 
It is important to determine the categorization of an individual under the
Geneva Conventions in order to establish the individual’s level of protected 
rights. Under the Geneva Conventions, someone is either a combatant, 
who can be lawfully attacked, or a civilian, who cannot be lawfully attacked 
unless they “directly participate in hostilities.”136 If an individual is a
member of a state military or state armed group, they can lawfully be 
attacked even if they are not actively participating in combat because they 
serve a “continuous combat function.”137 A civilian directly participates
in hostilities when “they carry out acts which aim to support one party 
to the conflict by directly causing harm to another party, either directly 
inflicting death, injury or destruction, or by directly harming the enemy’s 
military operations or capacity.”138 Conversely, a civilian indirectly participates
in hostilities when they contribute to “general war effort[s] of a party, but 
do[] not directly cause harm.”139 This indirect participation could lead to
a loss of protection from attack, but such a determination is heavily fact 
dependent.140 
2. International Humanitarian Rights Law & the ICCPR 
During peacetime, when there is no armed conflict to trigger the Geneva 
Conventions requirements, International Human Rights Law (IHRL) operates 
in its place.141 IHRL was established to create government obligations and 
ensure fundamental human rights and freedoms are protected.142 Most
IHRL provisions can be suspended in times of armed conflict but are then 
supplemented with the Geneva Conventions.143 IHRL can be found in various 
134. Id.
 135. Id.
 136. See Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions & Answers, INT’L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/faq/direct-participation-
ihl-faq-020609.htm [http://perma.cc/J8YB-XSSM].
137. Id. For example, a member of the U.S. military can be deployed to Afghanistan 
and be killed while eating dinner without violating the Geneva Conventions. 
138. Id.
 139. Id.
 140. Id. The determination of direct or indirect is fact determinative. For example, a 
truck full of ammunition driven from a factory to the front lines would be considered direct 
participation in hostilities, whereas driving the same truck full of ammunition far from the 
frontlines to a port to be traded would be considered indirect participation. 
141. Advisory Service, supra note 123. 
142. Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/human-
rights [http://perma.cc/P9F6-SMEG].
143.  An IAC is only between two states. Advisory Service, supra note 123. 
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treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).144 Countries, such as the United States, who ratified the ICCPR
are obligated to:  
[P]rotect and preserve basic human rights, such as: the right to life and human 
dignity; equality before the law; freedom of speech, assembly, and association;
religious freedom and privacy; freedom from torture, ill-treatment, and arbitrary
detention; gender equality; the right to a fair trial; right [to] family life and family 
unity; and minority rights.145 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Latin American Drug Cartels Recategorized as 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
The first step of this analysis is to determine if LADCs can be recategorized
as terrorist organizations under 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A–C). This statute 
provides three requirements for an organization to be considered an FTO, 
which will be applied to LADCs to determine if they can be recategorized.146 
However, all of the elements are easily satisfied, therefore allowing
recategorization: (1) the organization is foreign, (2) the organization engages 
in terrorism or terrorist activity, and (3) such activities threaten U.S. national 
security or citizens.147 
The first element, whether the organization is foreign, is easily met.148 
Some notorious LADCs that concern the U.S. government include: the Sinaloa
Cartel, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, the Juarez Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, 
Los Zetas Cartel, and the Beltran-Leyva Organization.149 The U.S. government
has not focused explicitly on other Latin American countries recently, but 
has paid attention to Colombian and Dominican organizations that collaborate 
with Mexican cartels that smuggle drugs into the United States.150 
144. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
145. The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992. FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & 
Political Rights (ICCPR), AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-covenant-civil-
political-rights-iccpr [http://perma.cc/LW55-9WZY] [hereinafter FAQ: ICCPR].
146.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A–C). 
147. See id.
 148. Id. § 1189(a)(1)(A). 
149. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2018 NATIONAL  DRUG THREAT 
ASSESSMENT 97 (Oct. 2018) [hereinafter NDTA]. 
150. See id. at 100, 102. 
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The second element, whether the organization engages in terrorist activities 
or terrorism, requires more discussion but is nonetheless satisfied.151 This
element does not require the acts of terror be committed in the United States.152 
In Mexico, there has been increased violence, assassinations, and intimidation 
of politicians since 2017, including a surge in the lead up to the 2018 
elections.153 Drug cartels have been responsible for hanging corpses in public, 
beheadings, and placing car bombs.154 Violence has skyrocketed even though 
former Mexican President Felipe Calderón fought against the cartels with 
full military force in an effort to save Mexico from its deteriorating security.155 
Cartels target competing cartels, government officials, journalists, police, 
and ordinary civilians with brutal violence to show power and instill fear 
in their area.156 This violence undoubtedly fits the definition of terrorism 
under 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) and the definition of terrorist activities 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).157 
The final element, whether the activities threaten U.S. citizens or national 
security, is also easily satisfied.158 An essential and inherit component of
the illicit drug trade is violence and fear, “Traffickers use it to settle disputes, 
and a credible threat of violence maintains employee discipline and a 
semblance of order with suppliers, creditors, and buyers.”159 U.S. citizens
are at high risk if they cross the border into Mexico, as demonstrated by 
the November 2019 massacre of women and children on their way back
to the United States after visiting family in Mexico.160 
Additionally, drugs brought into the United States have likely led, at 
least in part, to an increase in drug poisoning deaths.161 In 2016, approximately
174 people died every day from drug poisoning, which is a greater number 
of deaths than homicide, motor vehicle crashes, firearms, and suicide.162 
151.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(B). 
152. Id. § 1189(a)(1).
153. JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41576, MEXICO: ORGANIZED CRIME AND 
DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2020). 
154. Id.
 155. Christopher J. Curran, Spillover: Evolving Threats and Converging Legal Authorities
in the Fight Against Mexican Drug Cartels, 6 HARV. NAT’L. SEC’Y J. 344, 352–53 (2015). 
156. Id.
157.  22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). 
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C); NDTA, supra note 149, at v (“Illicit drugs, as well as
the transnational and domestic criminal organizations who traffic them, continue to represent 
significant threats to public health, law enforcement, and national security in the United 
States.”). 
159. BEITTEL, supra note 153, at 2. 
160. Gamboa, supra note 7.
 161. See NDTA, supra note 149, at v.
 162. See id.
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The spillover violence and increase of drug-related deaths are a threat to 
U.S. nationals and U.S. national security.163 
For the reasons stated above, LADCs can be recategorized as terrorist 
organizations under 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A–C) with no changes to the 
current law. 
B. International Law Applied to the Recategorization of 
Latin American Drug Cartels 
1. The Geneva Conventions Applied to the War on Terror
President George W. Bush correctly identified two separate conflicts in 
the War on Terror.164 The first conflict was against al-Qaeda, “A clandestine
organization with elements in many countries and composed apparently 
of people of various nationalities, which has the purpose of advancing 
certain political and religious objectives by means of terrorist acts directed 
against the United States.”165 Al-Qaeda was not considered a state and, 
therefore, not protected by the Geneva Conventions as an NIAC or IAC 
because the group lacked proper organizational structure and motives.166 
The second conflict in the War on Terror was against the Taliban.167 
However, unlike al-Qaeda, the Taliban was effectively the government of 
Afghanistan at the time of the conflict.168 Both the United States and 
Afghanistan were signing parties to the Geneva Conventions,169 so this 
conflict was considered an IAC under the Geneva Conventions.170 Since
163. John Burnett, ‘Spillover’ Violence From Mexico: Trickle or Flood, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (July 6, 2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/07/06/137445310/spillover-violence-
from-mexico-a-trickle-or-flood [https://perma.cc/HRF7-R6N9].
164. Aldrich, supra note 87, at 893. 
165. Id.
 166. Id.; see also Jeffrey S. Schoenwald, Terrorist Organizations Are Not Entitled To the 
Protection of the Geneva Conventions, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
realspin/2015/03/26/terrorist-organizations-are-not-entitled-to-the-protection-of-the-
geneva-conventions/#79e0c15d96e6 [http://perma.cc/B6R6-7QDD]; see also International
Humanitarian Law, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, 
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-6/key-issues/ihl-terrorism-and-counter-
terrorism.html [http://perma.cc/3CAH-VJPY]; Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the War on
Terror, 79 NAVAL WAR COLL. INT’L L. STUD. 175 (2002). 
167. See Aldrich, supra note 87, at 893. 
168. Id.
 169. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Dec 8, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
170. Aldrich, supra note 87, at 893. 
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the Taliban was Afghanistan’s de facto government, the Taliban was bound 
to obey and could be protected under the Geneva Conventions.171 Aldrich 
concludes that “the legal difficulties . . . with the actions taken by the United 
States concerning prisoners captured in Afghanistan exist only with respect 
to persons who served in the armed forces of the Taliban, not with respect 
to those who were members of the [al-]Qaeda terrorist group.”172 
After Hamdan, which held that Common Article 3 is violated when 
detainees are labeled as “enemy combatants” in GTMO without due process,173 
the above two-part analysis of the War on Terror is likely outdated. Hamdan
implicitly held that detainees must be treated as combatants or civilians 
under the Geneva Conventions.174 Then, once they are captured, they must 
be treated as prisoners of war or civilians.175 The Court in Hamdan rejected 
the U.S. government’s argument that a person’s rights under the Geneva 
Conventions and U.S. Constitution could be categorically infringed on 
after the person was labeled an “enemy combatant.”176 Therefore, the Geneva 
Conventions protect all persons during times of NIAC or IAC, and even 
if the Geneva Conventions do not apply, at the very least, IHRL will apply. 
2. The Geneva Conventions Applied to the War on Drugs 
The first step is to establish which part of the Geneva Conventions applies 
—Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II Article I or the remaining 
Geneva Conventions—is to determine the type of conflict at issue. Unlike 
the Taliban, which acted as Afghanistan’s de facto government,177 drug 
cartels are not the legitimate governments in Latin American countries.178 
Rather, cartels operate with blatant disregard for the laws of their country 
and take advantage of the government’s inability to fight back adequately.179 
171. Id.
 172. Id. at 898. 
173. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 570–71. 
174. See id.
 175. See id.
 176. See id.
 177. Aldrich, supra note 87, at 893. 
178. The United States recognizes the legitimate governments in Latin American
countries, such as Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Chile. There are no countries in Latin 
America that do not have a recognized legitimate government. Bureau of Intel. & Rsch., 
Independent States in the World, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.state. 
gov/independent-states-in-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/WA3F-5DSN].
179. The illegal activities cartels engage in vary. For example, Los Zetas takes part
in the illegal drug trade but also “fuel theft, extortion, kidnapping, human smuggling, and 
arms trafficking.” NDTA, supra note 149, at 98. Whereas the Knights Templar operates in the 
illegal drug trade, extortion, and illegal mining. BEITTEL, supra note 153, at 26. Some cartels, 
such as the Columbian Medellín and Cali cartels, operate predominantly in the illegal drug 
trade. Drug Wars: the Columbian Cartels, PUB.BROAD.SERV., https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
386
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This means cartels must be non-state dissident groups and the conflict 
must be labeled as an NIAC under Additional Protocol II.
It could be argued that cartels are similar to governments because they 
operate in and defend specific regions where they have power.180 Cartels
aggressively protect the regions they operate in with public displays of 
extreme violence and mayhem that are then published to social media to 
spread fear.181 Although legitimate governments do not defend their borders 
with violence or mayhem against their citizens, governments do protect 
their borders from intrusion by engaging in wars and using government 
agencies to enforce the country’s laws.182 An example of how a cartel can 
act akin to a government, despite having a legitimate government in power 
in the country, is Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel.183 Escobar ruthlessly
protected his illegal cocaine enterprise, which made an estimated $420 
million per week and totaled approximately $22 billion a year.184 However,
Escobar earned the nickname “Robinhood” because he “hand[ed] out cash 
to the poor, buil[t] housing for the homeless, construct[ed] 70 community 
soccer fields, and buil[t] a zoo.”185 
There is no evidence that modern cartels give back to their operational
regions and people who live in those regions like the Medellín cartel. 
Notwithstanding this fact, the Medellín cartel was operating, albeit illegally 
and influentially, under an established and recognized sovereign government.186 
frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.html [http://perma.cc/6YMU-C4N4]; 
see Jeremy Kryt, Why the Military Will Never Beat Mexico’s Cartels, DAILY BEAST (July 
12, 2017, 6:57 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-the-military-will-never-beat-
mexicos-cartels [http://perma.cc/ZN6W-EXJA].
180. See Scott Steward, Tracking Mexico’s Cartels in 2019, STRATFOR (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tracking-mexicos-cartels-2019 [http://perma.cc/ 
QU2E-9G3Q].
181. For example, Los Zetas use extreme violence to intimidate rival cartels, law
enforcement, and civilians. BEITTEL, supra note 153, at 23. 
182. See, e.g., Border Security Overview, HOMELAND SEC. (Nov. 22, 2019), https:// 
www.dhs.gov/border-security-overview [https://perma.cc/7FNF-TW86] (explaining that 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security is responsible for ensuring national security 
and safe travel into and out of the United States).
183. See Amy Tikkanen, Pablo Escobar Columbian Criminal, BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/biography/Pablo-Escobar [http://perma.cc/2Z37-JTX7]. 
184. Amanda Macias, 10 Facts Reveal the Absurdity of Pablo Escobar’s Wealth, 
BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2015, 8:43 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/10-facts-that-
prove-the-absurdity-of-pablo-escobars-wealth-2015-9 [http://perma.cc/TT6D-ZUHV].
185. Id.
 186. See Christopher Wood et al., ‘El Chapo’ Guzman’s Reign Is Finally at an End
– Here’s How He Compares to Colombian Kingpin Pablo Escobar, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 
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Accordingly, the argument that cartels are similar to governments fails;
cartels are more similar to al-Qaeda than the Taliban in the War on Drugs. 
Therefore, LADCs are non-state actors and would be protected under Common
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II Article I if the Geneva Conventions 
are found to apply.
Next, it must be determined whether there is a sufficient minimum level 
of violence that rises beyond the standard “sporadic acts of violence.”187 
The minimum level of hostilities is easily satisfied because drug cartels
use violence as a way to settle disputes and instill fear into the surrounding 
population.188 Mexican drug cartel violence is displayed in “beheadings, 
public hanging of corpses, and murders of dozens of journalists and 
officials.”189 
Third, drug cartels must essentially possess organized armed forces to 
have control over an area.190 As discussed above, the cartels do not have typical 
governmental control over a geographic area because they are functioning 
under an established Latin American government.191 However, this does
not mean the cartels lack organized armed forces that essentially control 
areas of countries, as seen by Guzman’s escape.192 Cartels are all structured 
differently, but one common thread of truth is that their success depends 
on orders being followed promptly and accurately.193 Although traditional
drug kingpins and their hierarchical armies are less common in modern 
cartels, smaller fragmented groups are more common and equally as, if 
not more, violent.194 The violence created by either type of cartels is difficult
21, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-pablo-escobar-and-el-chapo-
guzman-compare-2019-3 [https://perma.cc/B283-CA82]. 
187.  Additional Protocol II, supra note 125. 
188.  BEITTEL, supra note 153, at 2. 
189. Id. at 1. 
190. See Armed Conflict Defined, supra note 125. 
191.  See infra note 196. 
192.  BEITTEL, supra note 153, at 11–12. 
193. Tarry Gross, ‘Narconomics’: How The Drug Cartels Operate Like Wal-Mart and 
McDonald’s, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 15, 2016, 1:05 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/02/15/ 
466491812/narconomics-how-the-drug-cartels-operate-like-wal-mart-and-mcdonalds 
[https://perma.cc/WDR5-KJZP] (explaining that cartels operate similarly to big-box stores 
and franchises); Douglas Johnson, The Latin American Drug Sindicates, E. SIDE UNION 
HIGH SCH. DIST., http://staff.esuhsd.org/balochie/studentprojects/drugsindicates/index.html
[http://perma.cc/5Z9C-SRVR] (showing the hierarchical structure of the Cali Cartel); Gisela
Bichler et al., Drug Supply Networks: A Systematic Review of the Organizational Structure 
of Illicit Drug Trade, BMC (Jan. 31, 2017), https://crimesciencejournal.biomedcentral.com/
articles/10.1186/s40163-017-0063-3 [https://perma.cc/N25L-5PX7] (explaining that modern
cartels have various forms and are more decentralized than cartels from the 1980s to the
1990s); see generally BEITTEL, supra note 153 (explaining the various structural forms
which allows cartels to stay in power).
194. BEITTEL, supra note 153, at 11. 
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to measure because of restricted governmental reporting.195 Despite the
difficulty in determining the specific cartel that may be causing the violence, 
it is known that the increase in violence discussed above is done by one 
of the cartels as a means to control their region.196 
Accordingly, LADCs should be covered by the Geneva Conventions 
under Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II Article I. However, 
similar to how President George W. Bush categorized al-Qaeda,197 if LADCs
were recategorized, they would not fall under the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions. The Geneva Conventions do not govern because LADCs are 
not states, but rather terrorist organizations and, therefore, are not covered 
as NIACs or IACs of Common Article 3.198 Since the Hamdan ruling, this 
area of law remains unsettled.199 
Nonetheless, even individual terrorists and terrorist organizations are 
protected under IHRL found in the ICCPR. Thus, even though some may 
feel that alleged terrorists deserve no rights, the U.S. government must ensure 
basic human rights under the ICCPR.200 
C. Legal Benefits & Consequences of Recategorization 
1. Legal Benefits of Recategorization 
a. Increased Funding for the War on Drugs 
If LADCs are recategorized as FTOs, the military would likely receive 
an increase in funding. Since the War on Terror’s commencement in 2001, 
the military budget has fluctuated in response to international tensions, 
terrorism incidents, and developing goals.201 For instance, when the War 
on Terror began in 2001, Congress appropriated approximately $22.9 
billion.202 As violence escalated and U.S. forces stood their ground, the military 
budget increased with a record high of $186.9 billion appropriated for the 
195. Id. at 12. 
196. See id. at 16, 23. 
197. See Aldrich, supra note 87, at 203. 
198. See Armed Conflict Defined, supra note 125. 
199. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 570–71. 
200. ICCPR, supra note 144, at 179; FAQ: ICCPR, supra note 145. 
201. See generally Kimberly Amadeo,War on Terror Facts, Costs, and Timeline, BALANCE
(July 23, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/war-on-terror-facts-costs-timeline-3306300
[http://perma.cc/9Y6E-X3MN] (explaining the fluctuation of the military budget throughout 
the War on Terror in response to events during respective years). 
202. Id.
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War on Terror in 2008.203 There was a decline in appropriations for the
War on Terror from 2009 until 2016—with Congress appropriating $58.9 
billion in 2016.204 Since then, Congress has increased the appropriated funds 
for the War on Terror to $164.6 billion in 2020.205 If LADCs are recategorized 
as FTOs, the budget would likely increase to account for a more expansive 
War on “Narco-terrorism.” 
b. Increased Military Presence in Foreign Countries 
With increased funding for the War on Narco-terrorism, the United States
would be able to expand military bases in Latin America. This would, in
turn, increase the number of military personnel throughout Latin America 
to combat the new War on Narco-terrorism. If this new war follows a similar 
history to the War on Terror, increased U.S. military presence would likely 
lead to the capturing and trying of high-ranking cartel members. LADCs 
would likely be unable to function properly if high-ranking cartel members 
were captured,206 as shown by the decreased stability of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban when Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein were captured and 
killed.207 
c. Drone Strikes
Starting with the Obama administration, drone strikes have become the 
predominant method of fighting the War on Terror.208 One explanation for 
the increased use of drone strikes in the War on Terror is that “they have 
made attacks more precise . . . [resulting] in fewer casualties and less 
destruction.”209 It is also important to note that the Geneva Conventions




206.  This argument has some problems. Namely, unlike the ideologically driven
terrorist organizations, cartels are run more like a business where the leader can change
without the organization collapsing. For example, El Chapo was captured and tried but the 
Sinaloa cartel survived with El Chapo’s son taking his place. BEITTEL, supra note 153, at 
16–17 (“Sinaloa survived the arrest of its billionaire founder El Chapo Guzmán in 2014.”). 
This ability to change high-ranking members makes LADCs more likely to survive.
207. See Meghan Keneally, The War in Afghanistan Started 18 Years Ago to Fight 
Terrorism After 9/11. Is the US Safer, ABC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2019, 2:02 AM), https://abcnews.go. 
com/International/war-afghanistan-started-18-years-ago-fight-terrorism/story?id=65981061 
[http://perma.cc/54AE-AP5H].
208. See Müller, supra note 73. 
209. The Use of Armed Drones Must Comply with Laws, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS (Oct. 5, 2013), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/interview/2013/ 
05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm [http://perma.cc/7GXN-CR2P].
390
STANDON_22-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2021 11:22 AM     
  
   
 
 
      














[VOL. 22:  365, 2021] Foreign Terrorist Organizations
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
and gathering intelligence.210 The use of drones is subject to IHL, meaning 
the military must use the utmost care to ensure civilians are not harmed 
during drone missions.211 
If LADCs are recategorized as FTOs, the U.S. military would be able
to use drone strikes on the new terrorists provided the military takes “all 
feasible precautions in order to spare the civilian population and infrastructure.”212 
The military would have to “suspend or cancel an attack if the expected
incidental harm or damage to civilians or civilian objects would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”213 
It is foreseeable that foreign countries would resist the U.S. military
using ordinances in their country. To avoid such tension, the United States
and respective Latin American countries would need to work out an agreement 
regarding the scope of authority for the U.S. military, the scope of joint
operations, the requirements for engaging LADCs, and the parameters of 
other military action. 
d. Use of the PATRIOT Act 
If LADCs are recategorized as FTOs in the War on Narco-terrorism, the 
U.S. government would be allowed to use the full force of the PATRIOT 
Act. This would allow police and other agents within U.S. borders to use 
increased surveillance on individuals who are suspected of involvement 
in the illicit drug trade regardless of their rank. Agents would also be allowed 
to take advantage of delaying when they inform suspects that a warrant 
was issued to search their private effects. 
These additional benefits from the PATRIOT Act would allow agents 
to follow leads and connections up the chain of the cartels to find high-
ranking members more efficiently. During this process, agents would also 
remove illicit drugs from the reach of consumers and decrease the profits 
of LADCs.
210. See id.














    
 
 
   
    
  
 
e. Increased Border Security & Ability to Bar Access into the
United States and Freeze Assets 
If LADCs are recategorized as FTOs, it would allow the United States 
to freeze assets and deny known cartel members and suspected affiliates 
entry into the United States.214 Prosecutors would also be able to charge 
low-level dealers with assisting an FTO under 21 U.S.C. § 2339A.215 With 
these increased capabilities and funding, border security could be expanded 
to ensure that cartel members and individuals working for cartels are kept 
out of the United States or are severely monitored. 
2. Legal Consequences of Recategorization 
a. A High Number of Arrests Does Not Correlate 
with a Successful War 
A consequence of the War on Terror is the inability of law enforcement 
agencies to capture high-ranking members of terrorist organizations. Instead,
low-ranking members are predominately apprehended since it often takes 
many years, countless hours of planning, and thousands of dollars to apprehend 
high-ranking targets.216 Even when high-ranking members are captured, 
imprisoned, or killed, the war continues. For example, it took the United 
States nearly ten years to capture and kill Osama bin Laden, and although 
the capture of Saddam Hussein amounted to less than one year of work, it 
required three additional years for trial and execution.217 Within the 
approximately seven years it took to capture these two high-ranking targets 
the United States spent over a trillion dollars on the Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars.218 It is estimated that by the end of 2020 the War on Terror will have 
cost the United States $7 trillion in military spending alone.219 
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C); Jonathan Landay et al., Exclusive: After Cabinet
Opposed Mexican Cartel Policy, Trump Forged Ahead, REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2019, 8:07 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mexico-cartels-exclusive/exclusive-after-
cabinet-opposed-mexican-cartel-policy-trump-forged-ahead-idUSKBN1YU0XQ [http:// 
perma.cc/KKS9-8WSF]; Curran, supra note 155. 
215.  21 U.S.C. § 2339A (2009). 
216. See generally Daniel L. Byman, Are We Winning the War on Terrorism?, 
BROOKINGS (May 23, 2003), https://www.brookings.edu/research/are-we-winning-the-
war-on-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/MWE6-5UXQ] (explaining that in 2003 the United 
States arrested, captured, or killed over 3,000 al-Qaeda members and charged over 200 of 
them as terrorists—a majority of al-Qaeda leadership remained alive and free to rebuild 
and expand al-Qaeda). 
217. See U.S.-led War on Terror, supra note 49. 
218. See Amadeo, supra note 201; see also U.S.-led War on Terror, supra note 49. 
219. Leo Sahne III, Price Tag of the ‘War on Terror’ Will Top $6 Trillion Soon, MIL. 
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/11/
14/price-tag-of-the-war-on-terror-will-top-6-trillion-soon/ [http://perma.cc/W256-FTC6]. 
392
STANDON_22-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2021 11:22 AM     
  









   
  
 
   







[VOL. 22:  365, 2021] Foreign Terrorist Organizations
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
In the time it took to capture and kill Saddam Hussein and Osama bin 
Laden many low-level terrorists were arrested. By March 21, 2019, 178 
individuals were charged as terrorists.220 Yet, of the total detainees imprisoned 
at GTMO, 92% of them were not, in the government’s opinion, al-Qaeda 
fighters and did not fit the enemy combatant status.221 As of 2014, there 
were still 149 men detained at GTMO.222 Of these men, forty-six are subject 
to indefinite detention because they cannot be prosecuted but are “too 
dangerous” to be released, while eighty-six were cleared for release but were 
not released.223 Although the United States captured and killed two high-
profile terrorists, its efforts in doing so resulted in great injustices to humankind 
and did not end the War on Terror.224 
A similar comparison can be drawn to the current War on Drugs. In 
2017, there were 1,632,921 arrests for drug-related offenses in the United 
States.225 Of these arrests, only 238,406 (approximately 14.6%) were
for the sale or manufacturing of drugs, while the remaining 1,394,515 
(approximately 85.4%) were for drug possession.226 Simply because 1.6 
million drug-related arrests were made in 2017 does not mean the United 
States is safer or has less drugs on the streets. Not only has law enforcement 
arrested a shockingly few number of manufacturers and dealers for the 
amount of money being spent, but individuals who are arrested are unlikely 
to be high-ranking members of a cartel.227 
A historical example of this problem comes from the aforementioned 
Pablo Escobar. Escobar rose to power as a high-profile cartel member in 
the 1980s but was not killed until 1993.228 During this time, Escobar 
220. Emma Broches & Julia Solomon-Strauss, International Terrorism Prosecutions 
During Winter 2019, LAWFARE (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-
terrorism-prosecutions-during-winter-2019 [http://perma.cc/K8MG-EEAS]. 
221.  DUFFY, supra note 106, at 672. 
222. Id.
 223. Id. at 672–73. 
224. Besides the great deal of injustice at GTMO, in 2005 there were approximately
3,000 non-combatant civilian deaths from the War on Terror in Afghanistan and almost
25,000 in Iraq. Girardeau A. Spann, Terror and Race, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 89, 94 (2005). 
225. Estimated Annual Number of Arrests for Drug Offenses in the US by Type 
of Offense, DRUG WAR FACTS, https://www.drugwarfacts.org/table/annual-drug-arrests [http:// 
perma.cc/5RZM-P2WB]. 
226. Id.
227. Over $47 billion is spent annually in the United States on the War on Drugs. 
Drug War Statistics, DRUG POL’Y ALL., http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/drug-war-statistics
[http://perma.cc/THC6-TGRG].
228. Tikkanen, supra note 183. 
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supplied 80% of the world’s cocaine and imported fifteen tons of cocaine 
into the United States every day.229 This means that Escobar supplied four 
out of every five lines snorted in the United States.230 It did not matter 
how much money was spent trying to bring down the Medellín Cartel or 
the fact that Escobar was eventually imprisoned, the Medellín Cartel 
continued.231 
The War on Terror and the War on Drugs share many common themes, 
the most prevalent of which proves that law enforcement agencies are not 
effectively fighting either war simply because arrest numbers are high.
Terrorist organizations have not ceased terrorizing the world when their
leaders are captured or killed. Similarly, drugs have not stopped flowing
into the United States despite high arrest and incarceration numbers. If
LADCs are recategorized as FTOs, it is unlikely, based on the history of 
the War on Terror, that the War on Narco-terrorism would have greater 
success in capturing high-ranking officials or bringing down LADCs as a
whole. 
b. Strains on International Relations
U.S. officials, such as former President Trump, may be genuinely trying 
to help Latin American countries and protect U.S. national security by 
recategorizing LADCs. However, Mexico has explicitly declined this “help” 
because the United States’ unilateral advancements against LADCs makes 
some countries nervous.232 
Additionally, with the United States’ brutal and bloody history in the 
Middle East, it is worrisome to know the War on Terror could spread closer
to U.S. borders. If LADCs are recategorized, the United States would likely
increase the amount of military personnel in Latin America. This increased 
presence, coupled with the known violence of LADCs, is likely to strain 
foreign relations.
A major reason the United States is able to occupy countries in the name 
of fighting terror is because the occupied country is either complicit and 
welcomes intervention or has a weak government as be to nonexistent and
229. Macias, supra note 184. 
230. Id.
 231. Tikkanen, supra note 183. 
232. Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador specifically requested the 
recategorization not be made. Trump Says He Will Hold Off Designating Mexican Drug 
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unable to stop the United States’ occupation.233 However, once a government
is strong enough to resist the U.S. military or the looming threat has receded 
sufficiently, the United States can be expelled from that country.234 If countries
are resisting the recategorization before it happens, it seems unlikely that 
they would allow their countries to be occupied by the U.S. military or 
bombed by drone strikes. 
c. Asylum Seekers
If the United States recategorized LADCs to FTOs, thus beginning a 
War on Narco-terrorism, migrants fleeing the occupied countries would 
be more likely “to win asylum charges by claiming they were fleeing
terrorism.”235 This claim of fleeing terrorism could extend beyond Latin
America, because “while Mexican cartels’ territorial stronghold is within 
their own country, they have representatives on every continent except 
Antarctica.”236 
Finally, some are worried that the United States’ expansion of FTO
designation would not logically stop at cartels, but rather could expand to 
various foreign gangs and other criminal organizations.237 This could lead
to an expansion of claims by other asylum seekers outside of Latin America 
which “would weaken [former President] Trump’s immigration policies.”238 
233. For example, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq was complicit in the U.S. 
occupation because there was an insufficient foundation for a functioning democratic 
government. Kyle Crichton et al., Timeline of Major Events in the Iraq War, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/08/31/world/middleeast/
20100831-Iraq-Timeline.html?src=tptw#/#time111_3263 [http://perma.cc/RU38-H3B5].
Syria, during their civil war during the aftermath of the Arab Spring, for example, had 
little to no government to oppose the U.S. occupation of their country. Not only was there 
no strong government, but the people of Syria called for Democracy as terrorist groups caused 
chaos and terror throughout the country. Arab Spring, HISTORY (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www. 
history.com/topics/middle-east/arab-spring [http://perma.cc/7ZUB-36VY]. 
234.  Iraq, for example, decided to expel U.S. military forces once terrorist threats 
decreased and the government was stable enough to not need constant U.S. support. See 
Steve Inskeep, Why U.S. Troops Should Stay Even Though Iraq’s Parliament Voted Them 
Out, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/07/794163542/why-
u-s-troops-should-stay-even-though-iraqs-parliament-voted-them-out [http://perma.cc/ 
F9PB-N29E].
235. Landay et al., supra note 214. 






























If LADCs are recategorized as FTOs to fight a War on Narco-terrorism, 
then funding for the military and other national defense would almost certainly 
increase because of the expansion of U.S. military operations. This means, 
however, that money would be diverted from other sources.239 Since the
United States only has a finite amount of money in the national budget, 
the more money the United States spends on the military means less funds 
are available for other institutions, such as education, Social Security, or 
Medicare.240 
e. Draining the U.S. Justice System
Drug offenders, including mules, low-level dealers, or suppliers, within 
the United States could be charged with assisting an FTO under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2339A if LADCs are recategorized to FTOs.
For example, a low-level drug dealer caught selling drugs that had been
smuggled for a Mexican drug cartel could be charged with assisting an FTO.
In order to prove this charge, law enforcement would need to spend extra 
time and resources searching for any connection between the low-level
dealer and the Mexican cartel. The lower down the drug cartel’s hierarchy
the accused dealer is, the less likely they are to have actual knowledge of
the source of the drugs or that they are providing material assistance to
LADCs by selling its product. Still, the government could argue that even 
low-level drug dealers should reasonably know that illicit drugs often come
from foreign cartels and that selling these illegal drugs provides material
support by completing the final step of the supply chain–selling to drug users. 
Assuming that law enforcement is able to provide sufficient evidence
to prosecute and convict the low-level drug dealer for the drug offenses
and the charge for providing material support to an FTO, the low-level
drug dealer would then be in prison for longer than previously possible. 
The government would then need to feed, clothe, and shelter the low-level 
drug dealer. Because the low-level drug dealer was likely unaware, but
still maintain the requisite mens rea, they assisted an FTO in selling its 
drugs, precious government resources are wasted imprisoning the low-
level drug dealer. Not to mention the fact that the low-level drug dealer 
likely had no way of knowing the source of the drugs, whether that source 
239. See Jeff Stein & Aaron Gregg, U.S. Military Spending Set to Increase for Fifth 
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be the United States, LADCs, or any other supplier in the world. Therefore,
charging low-level drug dealers with assisting an FTO is ineffective at
fighting the War on Narco-terrorism and only wastes U.S. resources.
f. Due Process & Court Jurisdiction 
The War on Terror also resulted in a surplus of due process and jurisdictional
issues. Once suspected terrorists were arrested, constitutional due process 
violations and lack of judicial oversight became a prominent issue. The 
main reason for the lack of judicial oversight originated from attempts by 
Congress and the President to keep detainee cases from being heard in 
civilian federal courts.241 As discussed in the next section, detainees faced 
immense hardship and were not entitled to have their cases heard by U.S. 
courts until the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.242 Eventually, in several
landmark cases the United States Supreme Court held that the Judiciary 
could hear habeas corpus cases from prisoners in military bases outside 
the United States,243 U.S. courts did not have to defer to the Executive 
Branch for determinations of “enemy combatant” status,244 and all detained 
persons were protected by the Geneva Conventions.245 
Although the War on Terror shifted away from the imprisonment of 
detainees under the Obama administration, it seems unlikely that capturing 
and detaining suspects will stop completely.246 Capturing suspects for 
information and inside intelligence is a historically common and widely 
accepted method of waging warfare.247 The third Geneva Convention was 
specifically written to protect prisoners of war while detained by enemy 
armies.248 
241. DUFFY, supra note 106, at 669–70. 
242. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466 (2004); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 507 (2004); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 724 (2008). 
243. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466. 
244. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507–08. 
245. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 563–64. 
246. Denise A. Cardman, Enemy Combatants, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.american 
bar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/civil_liberties/enemy
_combatants/ [https://perma.cc/43KC-3JRW]; see Carol Rosenberg et al., ‘In Bad Shape
and Getting Worse,’ Guantanamo Poses Headaches for Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/us/politics/guantanamo-biden.html?searchResult 
Position=5 [https://perma.cc/N6Z8-YASU].
247. Prisoner of War: International Law, BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
prisoner-of-war [https://perma.cc/DNX4-PBNT].
248. The Geneva Conventions, supra note 120. 
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If LADCs are recategorized as FTOs, cartel members would be entitled 
to these protections as well as those laid out in the ICCPR. The U.S. government
would not be able to hide LADC members in a faraway military base with 
no hope for a trial, as was attempted in the War on Terror. The U.S.
government would be unable to infringe on detainee’s bare minimum rights
guaranteed by IHRL, the Geneva Conventions, and the U.S. Constitution,
even if an infringement would be more expedient for the military or national
security.249 
g. Detainee Imprisonment & Abuse 
After September 2001 terrorist attacks, when the War on Terror began, 
there was substantial support, internationally and domestically, for a strong
show of force in response.250 The first year of the U.S.-led War on Terror was
a success as showcased by the arrests of hundreds of suspected terrorists 
around the world, the prevention of more attacks in the United States, the 
overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and the closure of terrorist 
training camps.251 This success led to increased international cooperation 
in the global War on Terror.252 
However, as time progressed, overwhelming evidence of detainee 
abuse, torture, and harsh living conditions created inescapable criticisms.
Military personnel in Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq “[f]orcibly arrang[ed] detainees 
in various sexually explicit positions for photographing . . . [p]osition[ed] 
a naked detainee on a box, with a sandbag on his head, and attach[ed] wires 
to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture,” raped, humiliated, 
249. Although these bare minimum rights can be understood to be an excessive
burden on achieving safety and health within the United States as well as ending the War 
on Terror, War on Drugs, or War on Narco-terrorism, individual rights protect every person 
from the government. See Linda R. Monk, Rights, PUB. BROAD. SERV., https://www.pbs.org/
tpt/constitution-usa-peter-sagal/rights/#.YA9QDehKg2w [https://perma.cc/RUP2-E9YT]. It
is unwise to do away with basic individual rights because, without them, there would be 
no protection against the government accusing anyone it wanted of being involved in a 
war it created with little to no evidence, as was done during the War on Terror. See Hamdi, 
542 U.S. at 519–20, 528–29. 
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and tortured detainees.253 Similarly, in GTMO, the ICRC found evidence 
of torture.254 
Although this scale of detainee abuse and harsh living conditions from 
the War on Terror under the Bush administration are potentially outdated, 
as long as militaries are allowed to capture prisoners of war and hold them 
for questioning, abuse of detainees is always possible. If LADCs are 
recategorized as FTOs and the United States begins a War on Narco-terrorism,
it would simply allow the U.S. military to capture and detain more individuals 
in order to gather intelligence against LADCs. Detainees from the War on 
Narco-terrorism could face similar abuses and humanitarian issues as
those from the War on Terror. 
h. Increased Racial Profiling 
The War on Terror has undeniable ties to racial bias and racial profiling. 
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the American people continue 
to be barraged with pictures and news articles of terrorists from the Middle 
East threatening the United States. The government and media indoctrinated
U.S. citizens to fear people from a certain part of the world and those who 
adhere to certain religions.255 
Despite the rampant xenophobia and fear of foreign-grown terrorism in 
the United States today, approximately “73% of extremist-related murders 
in the past decade were committed by right-wing extremists, including 
white supremacists.”256 Michael McGarty, head of the FBI Counterterrorism 
division, told reporters that “there have been more arrests and deaths in 
the United States caused by domestic terrorists than international terrorists 
in recent years. . . . Racially-motivated violent extremists are responsible 
for the majority of lethal attacks and fatalities perpetrated by domestic 
253. Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.cnn. 
com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-fast-facts/index.html [http://perma.
cc/R7YC-FFDB].
254. Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo – Correction 
Appended, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/
red-cross-finds-detainee-abuse-in-guantanamo.html [https://perma.cc/GUU6-W3S9].
255. Why Do Americans Still Fear Muslim Terrorists More Than White-Supremacist 
Terrorists? Revisit these MEF Videos for Some Clues, MEDIA EDUC.  FOUND. (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.mediaed.org/christchurch/ [https://perma.cc/Q3HU-K6E4] [hereinafter Americans 
Still Fear Muslim Terrorists].
256. Jennifer Rubin, Just How Bad Is the White Nationalist Terrorism Problem, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/06/just-
how-bad-is-white-nationalist-terror-problem/ [http://perma.cc/7NUR-RW8C].
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terrorists since 2000.”257 At the time of this interview there were 850 domestic 
terrorism cases open with the FBI.258 Despite this high number, only about 
20% of the FBI counterterrorism agents were assigned to domestic terrorism 
cases.259 This is likely because most terrorist attacks occur in other countries,
such as Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Nigeria, Somalia, 
Nepal, Egypt, and Syria.260 
In 2017, there was a total of 8,584 terrorist attacks worldwide with a total 
of 18,753 deaths.261 The 23% decline from 2016 is “largely due to dramatically 
fewer attacks and deaths in Iraq.”262 In 2016, only 61 terrorist attacks took
place within U.S. borders compared to the 11,072 worldwide attacks.263 
The international nature of terrorism and the mass media coverage of terrorist
attacks in the Middle East likely caused an increase in fear amongst the 
American populous.264 
The United States’ historical struggle with racism greatly influenced the 
domestic War on Drugs.265 Former White House aide, John Erlichman,
admitted that the Nixon administration’s War on Drugs was a battle against 
the “antiwar left and black people.”266 Since then, black communities
continue to suffer from racial discrimination. In Florida, police officers 
“target poor black neighborhoods” for drug offenses and black defendants 
“spend two-thirds more time behind bars than white people.”267 
257. Mike Levin, 7 Key Questions About the Threat of Domestic Terrorism in America, 
ABC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/key-questions-threat-domestic-
terrorism-america/story?id=64811291 [https://perma.cc/KG7P-J5RX]. 
258. Domestic terrorism has nothing to do with the international community and
is motivated by domestic influences. Conversely, homegrown terrorism is considered 
international terrorism because these terrorists are often radicalized by overseas terrorist 
groups, such as ISIL and al-Qaeda. Id. 
 259. Id.
 260. NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, 
ANNEX OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION: COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2017, at 3 (Sept. 
2018), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/crt_national_consortium.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KB7R-EZZB].
261. Id. at 4. 
262. Id. at 3. 
263. NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM,
AMERICAN DEATHS IN TERRORIST ATTACKS 1995 – 2016: FACT SHEET 1, 4 (Nov. 2017), https:// 
www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_AmericanTerrorismDeaths_FactSheet_Nov2017.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/E87P-9UWR].
264. Americans Still Fear Muslim Terrorists, supra note 255. 
265. See Coyne & Hall, supra note 13, at 11. 
266. Id. at 11–12. 
267. Josh Salman et al., Florida’s Broken Sentencing System Designed for Fairness, 
it Fails to Account for Prejudice, HERALD TRIB. (Dec. 12, 2016), http://projects.herald
tribune.com/bias/sentencing/ [http://perma.cc/N3VU-HDMK]; Ezekiel Edwards, In Florida, 
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Throughout the country, this disparity is obvious. As recently as 2018, 
“[T]he imprisonment rate of black males was 5.8 times that of white 
males . . . .”268  Since the War on Drugs began in the 1980s, over 25.4 million 
people have been arrested for drug offenses, about one-third of them were 
Black.269 
It seems logical that if LADCs are recategorized as FTOs and the United 
States declares a War on Narco-terrorism, racial profiling would likely become
significantly more widespread. Government officials would be able to better 
hide racial profiling under the guise of fighting a War on Narco-terrorism.
Similar to the misconstrued facts and opinions plastered throughout the media, 
racial profiling would continue to have a disparate impact on minority
communities throughout the United States. 
i. Socioeconomics
When governments wage a war in an attempt to better society, such as
the War on Drugs and War on Terror, the social burden typically falls on 
poor communities. Policymakers throughout the United States have often 
270intertwined the War on Terror with poverty.  For example, in 2014, Senator 
John Kerry stated that poverty “in many cases, is the root cause of terrorism.”271 
However, academics have found no direct link to show that poverty is the 
only path to terrorism.272 Rather, poverty may be one of many reasons one
becomes a terrorist.273 
Furthermore, the negative economic impact from terrorism is well-
documented. The economic hardship caused by terrorist attacks since the 
War on Terror began has caused a decrease in foreign investments, and thus 
economic hardship throughout various countries.274 In 2014, the global economy 
268. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
PRISONERS IN 2018 1 (Apr. 2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Z22E-4CWD]. 
269. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DECADES OF DISPARITY DRUG ARRESTS AND RACE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 4 (2009), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0309web
_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPP4-77GG].
270. See David Sterman, Don’t Dismiss Poverty’s Role in Terrorism Yet, TIME (Feb. 
4, 2015, 4:28 PM), https://time.com/3694305/poverty-terrorism/ [http://perma.cc/93MQ-
FC3E]. 
271. Id.
 272. See id.
273.  Mental illness is also commonly attributed to people becoming terrorists. Id.
274.  Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, The Political Economy of Terrorism: A Selective 
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suffered $104 billion in losses.275 Besides the direct effect of a terrorist 
attacks, such as rebuilding infrastructure, emergency response costs, and 
medical costs, a country is significantly less likely to receive investments 
when terrorist attacks are more likely to occur.276 
The War on Drugs frequently burdens the poor more than the rich. One 
of the difficulties and frustrations about the War on Drugs is that cartel 
leaders are often viewed as untouchable while the poor population in the 
cartels’ operational country is harassed and arrested.277 In fact, “[I]nvolvement 
in drug markets is more often a sign of poverty than wealth.”278 For example, 
wealthy cartel members take advantage of farmers who are unable to farm 
enough food to survive on and cannot cultivate legal cash crops.279 In an 
attempt to survive, these poor farmers farm drug crops, which can provide 
a “decent income, even in small amounts.”280 
President Duterte of the Philippines took the War on Drugs to the farthest
extreme yet, and the poor in his country are still at high risk of being harassed, 
imprisoned, or killed.281 As of 2017, there have been over 7,000 deaths of 
the urban poor in the Philippines under the guise of the War on Drugs.282 
With increasing frequency, police officers kill unarmed people who beg 
for their lives in their own homes.283 If they are not killed, they are forced 
to leave their homes under threat of death, at which point the police steal 
whatever they like.284 Police admitted to being paid under the table for killing 
people who are only suspected of drug use.285 Although the Philippines
is not in Latin America, this country is a great example of how the War on 
Drugs can escalate to extreme levels. Accordingly, there is value in taking 
notice of such detrimental outcomes. 
If LADCs are recategorized as FTOs and the United States declares a
War on Narco-terrorism, countries with drug cartels would likely feel a 
275. Niall McCarthy, The Global Economic Impact of Terrorism [Infographic], FORBES
(Nov. 16, 2017, 8:08 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/11/16/the-
global-economic-impact-of-terrorism-infographic/#2a9f7e21d0f5 [http://perma.cc/YYR3-
6G5X].
276.  Bueno de Mesquita, supra note 274, at 4.
 277. CATHERINE MARTIN, CASUALTIES OF WAR: HOW THE WAR ON DRUGS IS HARMING 
THE WORLD’S POOREST 6 (2015), https://www.healthpovertyaction.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/12/Casualties-of-war-report-web.pdf [http://perma.cc/E384-33QG]. 
278. Id. at 9. 
279. Id.
 280. Id.
 281. See Matt Wells, Philippines: Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’ Is a War on the Poor, 
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major negative impact on their economy because of the ongoing terrorism 
in their country. As seen in countries with terrorist activity during the War 
on Terror, investments would likely decrease.
Thus, similar to the War on Terror, the War on Narco-terrorism would
likely impact impoverished communities. If the hardships from the regular 
War on Drugs fell primarily on poor communities, as seen in the United
States, Latin America, and the Philippines, then allowing more power and
discretion to the U.S. military and other federal agencies would not suggest
decreased hardship in impoverished areas. Similar to racial profiling under 
the guise of the War on Narco-terrorism, current problems from the War
on Drugs will only be exacerbated when terrorism is added to the mix. 
j. No End in Sight for the War on Drugs 
By recategorizing LADCs as FTOs, the United States would only be 
replicating the War on Drugs. As history shows, simply because the United
States spends more money and increases military presence in an attempt
to defeat drug cartels, does not mean the efforts will prevail. As a matter 
of fact, it seems like it would make the situation worse for those involved. 
The War on Drugs has only increased in violence with no real results. 
Drug cartels have not disappeared, illicit drug use has not decreased, and 
incarceration rates have increased.
The lack of results is shown in both the War on Drugs and the War on 
Terror. After El Chapo was tried and convicted, his son took his place and 
the Sinaloa cartel is still thriving.286 After terrorist organizations were defeated,
new terrorist organizations, such as ISIL, developed to fill the void of 
power.287 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Although the U.S. government may enjoy some increased benefits for
fighting the War on Drugs, the problems associated with the recategorization 
outweighs the perceived benefits. Accordingly, the United States should
not recategorize LADCs as FTOs. Instead, the United States should change
its domestic drug laws. Specifically, the United States should declassify
all drugs and allow citizens to recreationally consume any drugs they want 
for the following reasons: (1) bodily autonomy is a fundamental right, (2) 
286. Gallón, supra note 1. 
287. See Rise and Fall of ISIL, supra note 65. 
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legalization of illicit drugs would have a surplus of societal benefits, and 
(3) legalizing drugs legitimizes the cartels’ business and forces them to 
follow laws of commerce. 
A. Bodily Autonomy 
Bodily autonomy is a relatively new recognized fundamental right. The 
history of the right to privacy and bodily autonomy, however, is rich and
deep in U.S. history. In Griswold v. Connecticut, plaintiffs filed suit claiming 
a violation of their right to privacy as a married couple because a state law 
banned the use of contraceptives.288 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Constitution requires a “zone of privacy created by several fundamental 
constitutional guarantees.”289 The court struck down the state law and held 
that, 
[F]orbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture
or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact
upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle,
so often applied by this Court, that a governmental purpose to control or prevent 
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. (emphasis added).290 
This general right to privacy expanded over time through the landmark 
case of Roe v. Wade.291 Roe upheld the constitutional right to privacy and 
bodily autonomy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and, therefore, allowed for the mere regulation of abortion facilities and 
practices.292 
Despite historic governmental encroachments on the rights to privacy
and bodily autonomy, citizens have ultimately prevailed. For example, 
when alcohol prohibition began in the 1920s, U.S. citizens did not stop 
buying or consuming alcohol.293 Instead, alcohol was bought and sold on 
the black market free of regulations and taxes.294 Corruption became a
problem as people opened speakeasies and bribed police officers to leave 
bars open.295 Violence also increased as moonshiners and other illegal 
288.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
289.  Id. at 485. 
290. Id.
291.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
292.  Id. at 153–54. 
293. See Michael Lerner, Prohibition: Unintended Consequences, PUB. BROAD. SERV.,
https://www.pbs.org/kenburns/prohibition/unintended-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/
VH25-4GM6].
294. During the prohibition, the federal government lost $11 billion in tax revenue. New
York suffered because 75% of the state’s revenue was from liquor taxes. Id. 
 295. Id.
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manufacturers protected their product and sales.296 Finally, in 1933, the
government admitted defeat by signing the Twenty-First Amendment, which 
ended Prohibition.297 
The right to bodily autonomy is fundamental to a free society. Bodily
autonomy means the right to choose what we do with our bodies. These choices 
include a person’s right to decide whether to consume certain foods and 
drinks, whether to exercise, whether to undergo body modifications, whether 
to have sexual relations with or marry certain persons, and other decisions 
related to a person’s desire to participate in particular activities during 
their limited time in this world. The government does not have the right 
to tell individuals what they can and cannot do with their own bodies or
lives as long as it does not interfere with others in society. The federal
government was never meant to be a nanny state. 
B. Societal Benefits of Regulation Over Prohibition 
Portugal was the first country to decriminalize the recreational use of all 
drugs and has benefitted by a decrease in drug-related deaths and illnesses.298 
Portugal also saw an increase in people voluntarily seeking drug addiction 
treatment.299 
There are two main benefits for U.S. citizens and foreign nations if the 
U.S. government switched from outright prohibition to regulation. First, 
by legalizing drugs, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would be 
able to regulate the drug’s purity and potency.300 This would decrease the
number of deaths caused by drug poisoning because drugs would not be 
cut or laced with deadly toxins that could kill users. Second, the government 
would be able to increase revenue by taxing the drugs that were once illegal. 
Alcohol prohibition cost the federal government $11 billion in liquor 
296. See David Roos, How Prohibition Put the ‘Organized’ in Organized Crime, 
HISTORY (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/prohibition-organized-crime-al-
capone [http://perma.cc/N2UF-K6XK].
297. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
298. Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Learning from a Health and Human-Centered 
Approach, DRUG POL’Y ALL. (Feb. 20, 2019), http://www.drugpolicy.org/resource/drug-
decriminalization-portugal-learning-health-and-human-centered-approach [http://perma.cc/
2KJ8-86G8] [hereinafter Drug Decriminalization in Portugal]; Naina Bajekal, Want to 
Win the War on Drugs? Portugal Might Have the Answer, TIME (Aug. 1, 2018), https://time.
com/ longform/portugal-drug-use-decriminalization/ [https://perma.cc/3NAG-ABWF]. 
299. Id.
 300. See KALEM MURAD,THE FOOD ANDDRUG ADMINISTRATION AND DRUG LEGALIZATION:
A BRIEF MODEL OF REGULATION 10 (Harvard Libr. 2002). 
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revenue.301 This is indicative of how advantageous legalizing drugs can 
be since drugs will continue to be purchased regardless of legality, as seen 
during the prohibition of alcohol. 
C. Legitimizing Drug Industry Forces the Cartels’ Hands 
The United States is the largest consumer of illicit drugs in the world.302 
If the United States follows Portugal’s example, then cartels would lose 
their largest consumer base.303 LADCs could either continue their illicit
drug trade in other countries to make a fraction of their profits or legitimize 
their business to fit within international and domestic laws of commerce. 
Economically, LADCs would be more likely to legitimize their business 
because they have a higher likelihood of making money by continuing to 
import drugs to the United States despite taxes and regulations. Since 
Cartels have a monopoly over their product,304 meaning they control the
drug from its raw form until it is made into the drugs ingested by U.S. 
citizens, they would likely have little problem meeting purity standards 
set by the FDA. Switching from an illegal to a legitimate business may 
require restructuring but would ultimately be the most economically sound 
decision for LADCs. 
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S government has been fighting the War on Drugs since the 
Nixon administration, but has undeniably failed to stop drug use or reduce 
the dangers associated with drug trafficking. LADCs have become more 
violent in order to maintain control of their illegal industry and product. 
Moreover, violence surrounding illicit drugs has spread worldwide, from 
the spill over from LADCs into the United States to Philippine President
Duterte’s “death squads.” Furthermore, LADCs continue to prey on
impoverished and disenfranchised communities. The U.S. War on Drugs 
disproportionately impacts poor and minority communities, which increases 
the likelihood that members of these communities will turn to LADCs and 
gangs for support, rather than the government. Therefore, the United States 
must reconsider how it fights the War on Drugs. 
Former President Trump and others believe recategorization of LADCs
to FTOs and the War on Narco-terrorism is the correct solution to the evolving 
301. Lerner, supra note 293. 
302. Jennifer Warner, U.S. Leads the World in Illegal Drug Use, WEBMD (June 30, 
2008), https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/addiction/news/20080630/us-leads-the-
world-in-illegal-drug-use#1 [https://perma.cc/VE8X-WWJZ].
303. See Drug Decriminalization in Portugal, supra note 298. 
304. Gross, supra note 193. 
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LADCs problems. Although recategorization would allow for increased
funding for the War on Drugs, the use of drone strikes, and the use of national
security legislation, such as the PATRIOT Act, this approach is short-sighted. 
A War on Narco-terrorism would exacerbate the problems seen in the 
War on Terror and the War on Drugs, by diverting funding from other 
necessary areas of government, straining foreign relations, and creating 
many more problems. Instead, the U.S. government should reconsider 
domestic drug laws and replace prohibition with the regulation of illicit
substances. LADCs must be stopped, and the War on Drugs must be
reconsidered. Legalization of recreational drug use would allow citizens
to exercise their fundamental right to bodily autonomy, and society would
enjoy a surplus of benefits, such as increased tax revenue. Finally, legalization
would force LADCs out of an illegal market and into legal commerce.
LADCs cannot be permitted to continue terrorizing Latin American
countries and U.S. citizens. It is essential to U.S. national security, public
health and safety, and foreign relations, that the United States reevaluate
and revise domestic drug laws from prohibition to regulation. 
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